The Community Security Trust – Best Practice in Combating Antisemitic Hate

Michael Whine
Community Security Trust

I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Jewish ex-servicemen returning to Britain at the end of the Second World War were confronted by renewed antisemitism on the streets of London organized by supporters of Sir Oswald Mosley, who had been released from prison in 1943 after having been interned for three years on account of his Nazi sympathies.

Having spent six years fighting against Nazism and Fascism, the ex-servicemen were unwilling to accept this renewed incitement against their community. They therefore established the 43 Group, which successfully beat Mosley’s thugs off the streets. In parallel, the official body of Jewish war veterans, the Association of Jewish Ex-Servicemen (AJEX), developed a policy of seizing the street pitches before the fascists could do so (Beckman, 1993; Sugarman, 2010).

Twenty years later, when supporters of Colin Jordan’s National Socialist Movement and Spearhead (its paramilitary offshoot) began to attack Britain’s synagogues and its growing Afro-Caribbean community, activists within the Jewish community developed a similar response, creating the 62 Committee (Copsey, 2000; Williams, 1967).

The Jewish response was also successful in helping to stop racist violence, although it must be noted that at no time did the far-right extremists ever achieve any electoral successes. But while their activities were marginal to Britain’s overall political life, the far-right were not marginal to the life of Britain’s Jews who believed, with some justification, that the governments of the time were not interested in dealing with the intimidation and violence that minority communities were experiencing and cared only for the maintenance of public order. English law has always regarded racial incitement as a public order concern, rather than an offense against the rights or dignity of minorities.

When the Public Order Act was passed in 1936, as a direct response to pro-Nazi provocation, the most important provision, Section 5, made it an offense “to use threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour at a public meeting, with intent to provoke a breach of the peace or whereby a breach of the peace was likely to be occasioned.” It did not address the
consequences of intimidation for the Jewish community (Malik, 2009; Brownlie, 1968).

The Jewish community’s representative body, the Board of Deputies of British Jews, composed of elected representatives of all synagogues and communal institutions, but led in those days by the Anglo-Jewish aristocracy, was also active in lobbying government to crack down on the extremists’ violence (Langham, 2010; Tilles, 2010).

Despite public differences over strategy and tactics, the Board, 43 Group, 62 Committee, and AJEX all shared a capacity to penetrate the Nazis’ and neo-Nazis’ organizations and learn their plans. Their occasional public disagreements, however, did not stop them from sharing their information with each other, and, on occasion, the police (Thayer, 1965). Then, and later, the Jewish community groups were also willing to share their information and experiences with others who were prepared to combat racism and hate.

These distinct streams within the community, and the differing tactical approaches they adopted, were merged in the late 1980s as a consequence of new strategic thinking and changes in legislation. The Jewish groups felt that the far-right, which had been the primary historic source of antisemitism, was unlikely to fade altogether, but that it was being replaced by threats from new and different directions. The political and social antisemitism that had, for example, limited Jews’ membership in the higher professions, or in the commercial institutions of the City of London and certain golf clubs, were slowly fading as a consequence of the Holocaust, the creation of the State of Israel, and a more muscular and self-assured Jewish community, which had played a disproportionate part in defeating Nazism and Fascism.

Now, a resurgent anti-Zionist left, the overspill of Middle East tensions, and Islamism provided new directions from which Jew-hatred was flowing. Not every criticism of Israel and Zionism was viewed as antisemitic, but on many occasions such comment served to mask antisemitism. Moreover, from the late 1960s until the mid 1980s, terrorism posed very real dangers to Jewish communities around the world. Terror attacks were perpetrated not only by Palestinian secular groups, but also by neo-Nazi and white supremacist groups, and by far-left groups as well. Iranian proxies, and Hizbollah in particular, also threatened Jewish communities, as the 1994 AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires proved. Although terrorism from these sources peaked in the mid-1980s, at least in numerical terms, it was replaced after 2000 by the threat of terrorism from Al-Qaeda and its affiliates and supporters in the global jihad movement (Community Security Trust, 2011a).

The Jewish community also wanted to demonstrate a commitment to
aiding newer immigrant communities and fighting racism generally. The Board of Deputies had successfully campaigned during the 1960s for legislation that guaranteed equality on the one hand, and criminalized incitement to hate on the other. The legislative outcome of this political campaign had been the 1964 Race Relations Act, which, \textit{inter alia}, made it a crime to discriminate on racial grounds, and the 1986 Public Order Act, which criminalized incitement to racial hatred. Of course, the Board was not the only champion in these areas, but it did play a major part in drawing public attention to the malign consequences of discrimination and racism ("Improving Race Relations," 1969).

In 1986, therefore, the Board of Deputies’ Community Security Organisation (CSO) was established. With its creation, the CSO absorbed and adopted the activism of the 62 Committee and AJEX, along with the political defense work of the Board’s Defence Department. In 1994, the CSO became the Community Security Trust (CST), a stand-alone body, after changes in charities legislation facilitated the establishment of a stand-alone, not-for-profit body focused on security and defense for the Jewish community. In granting the CST charitable status, the Charities Commission had insisted that it incorporate in its instruments a reference to aiding other communities. Indeed, CST did precisely this, thereby formalizing its belief that, while antisemitism is a singular and unique hate form, the fight against antisemitism must be carried out in partnership with others, and that the experiences and techniques gained in doing so should be shared with other victim groups (CST, 1994).

II. \textbf{LEGAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS}

In parallel with these internal developments, the British government and its criminal justice agencies were also forced to make substantial changes to their response to hate crime, from the mid 1990s onward, which benefited the Jewish community. The catalyst for this process was the publication in 1999 of the “Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report” by MacPherson.

The lamentable failure of the Metropolitan Police Service to properly investigate the murder of black teenager Stephen Lawrence in April 1993 had set in motion a series of investigations and attitudinal changes that led to a radical revision in policing, and the manner in which the Police Service responds to hate crime. These are still working their way through the criminal justice system.

The 1936 Public Order Act (which had been passed to counter the rise in pre-War pro-Nazi activities) and the 1964 Race Relations Act (which outlawed racial discrimination) were not designed to address the growth of
“institutional racism,” which the authors of the “Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report” defined as follows:

the collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and professional service to people because of their colour, culture or ethnic origin. It can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes and behaviour which amount to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and racist stereotyping which disadvantage minority ethnic people. (Macpherson, 1969, pt. 6.34, p. 28)

The Inquiry made 70 separate recommendations that went to the heart of police responses to hate crime, and that were designed “to increase trust and confidence in policing amongst minority ethnic communities.” Among them was an agreed definition of a racist incident, as follows: “A racist incident is any incident which is perceived to be racist by the victim or any other person.” This is now known as the “Stephen Lawrence test.” Other recommendations included: having a code of practice for police and criminal justice agencies that would allow the reporting of racist incidents 24 hours a day at locations other than police stations; sharing information on racist incidents among the relevant agencies; creating a practical guide for responding to racial incidents; improving liaison with victims and their families; holding a rebuttable presumption that the public interest test be in favor of prosecution for hate crimes; and conducting training reviews for all police officers and scenes of crime officers. The latter would come to include racism and cultural diversity training (Macpherson, 1969, pp. 327-335).

In 2001, the Crown Prosecution Service commissioned a Diversity Monitoring Project, under the leadership of Professor Gus John, to investigate its own institutional practices, and to ensure that these were not contributing in any respect to the denial of justice, or to a lack of public confidence in prosecution systems on the part of black and other minority communities. The investigation found no evidence of racial discrimination in prosecution decision-making, but it did point to some worrying trends about the way in which racist crimes were prosecuted, and formulated 10 recommendations to address shortcomings. Among them were the establishment of a common standard for case work management, provision of a competency framework for prosecution advocates, creation and nurturing of an improved management culture, appointment of specialist prosecutors for racist and religious crimes, and the adoption of a holistic approach across the criminal justice system (Crown Prosecution Service, 2003).

This latter recommendation persuaded the Attorney General to establish a taskforce to analyze the context in which racial crimes occur, to consider improvements in training, and to devise strategies for good practice.
These include the development of common reporting methods for the police, to include the use of same categories and definitions, common protocols, online reporting of hate crimes, more effective police training, systematic victim and defendant monitoring by ethnicity, and training for prosecutors and judiciary.

To oversee the recommendations, the Office for Criminal Justice Reform established the Race for Justice Delivery Board, composed of senior representatives from the criminal justice agencies, to be advised by a small committee of civil society representatives, guided by an independent chairman. Following the formation of the Coalition Government in 2010, the committee names were changed to the Hate Crime Advisory Board and Advisory Group. They had already moved their affiliation from the Home Office to the Ministry of Justice, from where both continue to meet quarterly (Attorney General’s Office, 2006).

The second substantive development to affect Jewish communal concerns was the “Report of the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism” in 2006. This was chaired by the former Minister for Europe, the Rt. Hon. Dr. Denis MacShane MP, and its membership was drawn from all parliamentary parties. None of the members was Jewish, or represented any significant Jewish constituency, in order to obviate any charges of bias. Over the course of 12 months, they heard evidence from government, police, Jewish organizations, Muslim groups, Jewish day school principals, journalists, and many others. The initiative for the Inquiry came from the chairman of the All-Party Parliamentary Group Against Antisemitism (PCAA), John Mann MP, who realized that the nature of antisemitism was changing in the wake of Middle East developments, as was the direction from which it was now coming.

The Inquiry made 35 recommendations across a range of issues, which included recommendations that: the EUMC Working Definition of Antisemitism (see below) be adopted; greater government support for the Jewish community’s security needs be provided; the low number of prosecutions for antisemitic criminal acts be investigated; cooperation between the police and CST be intensified; academic research on the correlation between conflict in the Middle East and antisemitic attacks be commissioned; the government take action on internet sites that promote antisemitism; an academic working party to investigate and take action against antisemitism on British campuses be established; inter-communal dialogue be increased; and a special high-level envoy on antisemitism be appointed, among others (“Report of the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism: Government Response,” 2007).

Two particular recommendations concerned the Crown Prosecution Service, which was asked to investigate the low level of prosecutions for
crimes motivated by antisemitism, such as incitement, and to conduct a review of cases that had been brought before the courts in order to see what lessons could be learned. Again, an inquiry was established to which the CST gave evidence, with other Jewish organizations. The inquiry established that 69% of cases from the small sample investigated did not progress because of the failure to identify suspects. However, in 58% of cases that could have been prosecuted, it was the reluctance of witnesses or victims to support a prosecution by, for example, not wishing to give evidence in court, which resulted in cases’ being dropped. This clearly had implications for the prosecution service and the police, who were failing to pursue cases, but both needed the assistance of CST to encourage victims of crime to report the offenses, and to provide counseling where necessary. In this area, CST is well-placed, having earned the trust of members of the Jewish community over many years (“The Crown Prosecution Service Response to the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism,” 2008).

The Parliamentary Inquiry also required action by government, and that progress be reported. The government’s responses have therefore been published on an annual basis over three years and reflect the progress made in combating antisemitism across a wide spectrum of public life (“All-Party Inquiry into Antisemitism: Government Response, One Year on Progress Report,” 2008; “All-Party Inquiry Into Antisemitism: Government Response, Three Years on Progress Report,” 2010).

The CST played a substantial part in the antisemitism inquiry, both in the evidence that its staff gave and in assisting other witnesses, such as the representatives of the Board of Deputies and the Union of Jewish Students, to frame their evidence. It continues to play a major role in its participation in the Cross-Governmental Working Group to Tackle Antisemitism, which reviews the progress being made.

III. CST Framework

CST’s work is carried out by approximately 3,000 volunteers, managed by a professional team, based in offices in London, Manchester, and Leeds, and overseen by a management board. It is entirely self-financing and raises the funds it needs from within the community, although it has received two government grants in the past two years. (See below.) Its work covers the entire community, from secular to strictly orthodox. In this respect, it is almost unique among Anglo-Jewish institutions, as the latter community engage only to a minimal extent with other Jews. CST also makes no charge for its services so that no part of the community should be excluded (Community Security Trust, 2010).

Security work is subdivided into two areas. The first is the provision of
security advice and training for community members and institutions. Threat assessments, based on the expected participants, guest speakers, and local environment, are made for major communal events, and, where necessary, teams of trained volunteers provide security. In this respect, they often work closely with the police and venue management, establishing joint command and control infrastructures where appropriate.

The second area of security work is the provision of advice to Jewish community institutions and the staff who work in them. This includes technical advice for community buildings, and particularly for new buildings, on the basis that security hardening is more effective, and cheaper, at the design stage, than is adding it on retroactively. Three years ago, after analyzing the nature of terror attacks on synagogues in other countries and finding that the majority of injuries and fatalities were caused by bomb blast from terrorist attacks, CST embarked on a multi-million-pound project to shatterproof the windows of all synagogues and Jewish day schools. At the end of 2010, the UK government agreed to provide substantial funding for Jewish schools’ security needs, at CST’s urging, having accepted that the Jewish community faces particular terrorist and violence threats (Michael Gove, MP, personal communication, December 8, 2010).

The provision of information on political and physical threats to the community is a substantial part of CST work. Its customer base for information is the community leadership itself, law enforcement and government, and it has developed longstanding relationships with many of its customers who have come to rely on the quality and timeliness of its analyses.

A third area, and one that has grown in response to growing needs, is that of advocacy, public affairs, and communications. Among its many areas of engagement, CST is the primary author of communal submissions to government inquiries on the related matters of hate crime, counterterrorism, and legislation; participation in police, central government, and municipal authority advisory groups; and advice to minority faith groups. Two years ago the CST began to publish an annual report on antisemitic discourse, and more recently has developed a blog, on which staff members comment on current issues of concern to the Jewish community.

On its own initiative, or in response to requests for advice and assistance, CST has provided training on security and responses to hate crimes to National Churchwatch, a similar but much smaller body than CST that serves the Anglican Communion, various Hindu temples, Sikh gurdwaras, and, as of 2010, a number of Muslim communities and their mosques who have been victims of hate crime attacks perpetrated either by anti-immigrant groups or by radical Islamists.

Indeed, CST’s relationship with Hindu and Sikh national and local
bodies has developed in recent years to form a close, mutually supportive relationship. This is not a consequence of the growing diplomatic and commercial ties between Israel and India, but rather a result of the three ethnic-religious groups’ frequently adopting common public positions and sharing a common outlook on many social or political issues. As a result, occasional meetings are held between the communities’ professional and lay leaderships, and CST has provided developmental and infrastructure advice to the Hindu community, in particular, for more than 15 years.

IV. Reporting Hate Crime

CST has recorded antisemitic incidents in the UK since 1984, although the system was changed in 1990 to ensure consistency and greater accuracy, and to bring it into line with UK criminal justice system classifications and international moves to regularize the gathering of data by Jewish communities. Incident reports are gathered from the victims themselves, from press reports, and from the police. CST has an investigative capacity that has been used by the police on occasion, and regular meetings are held with national and local police agencies to facilitate information exchange and consistency of reporting. The CST annual Antisemitic Incidents Report has been cited by the British government as the definitive source of information on the subject for a number of years, although the police began to collect their own data, and published the first set of official figures in November 2010.

As a result of its experience, CST has long urged Jewish and other communities to standardize data collection and analysis, and it plays an active role within international agencies in educating law enforcement agencies and NGOs (Whine, 2009; Community Security Trust, 2011b).

In September 2009, the Home Office awarded CST a substantial grant from the hate crime section of its Victims’ Fund to assist its work with victims of antisemitic hate crime. This marked the first time that CST had received any government funding. The award was one of 10 made by the Fund to help support a range of organizations working on behalf of hate crime victims. This is a core element of CST work, and the money helped staff and volunteers to support victims, as well as advertise its services more widely through, for example, public advertising on bus stops in Jewish areas. At the end of 2010, CST received a second, smaller grant from the same fund. On this occasion, the money also was used to fund a booklet for other communities on reporting and responding to hate crime. The booklet provides a range of practical suggestions based on CST experience (“Grant Payment to Community Security Trust (CST),” 2010).

In early 2011, UK police services launched a national online hate
crime reporting system known as True Vision (see http://www.report-it.org.uk/home). This system enables victims to report hate crimes without having to visit police stations, recognizing that some may be fearful or unable to visit themselves. In doing so, it meets one of the recommendations urged by the Macpherson Report. True Vision also facilitates third-party reporting to enable them to report on behalf of victims, a system pioneered by CST in conjunction with some police forces. The online system provides safeguards to protect information, automatically refers reports to local police forces, and guarantees a 24-hour initial response. Website sidebar icons enable victims to access CST reporting mechanisms, and CST will in turn facilitate referrals to True Vision, in due course.

V. INTERNATIONAL WORK

In early 2011, CST received a substantial grant payable over two years from the European Commission for its proposed Facing Facts project to be carried out in partnership with the Brussels-based European Jewish Information Centre (CEJI) and the Netherlands-based Centre for Documentation and Information Israel (CIDI).

The project aims to distill the analytical and pedagogical knowledge gained by three experienced Jewish bodies, and extend it to smaller Jewish and other minority communities across Europe. It will focus on establishing national non-governmental infrastructures and methodologies for collecting data on antisemitic and other hate crimes.

This is not a new venture for CST, though the scale of its involvement is certainly novel. CST has maintained relations with Jewish community monitoring bodies for a number of years and routinely exchanges data with them. Indeed, a glance at the product of some European and Commonwealth equivalent bodies illustrates strong similarities in their names, organizational logos, and presentation styles (see, for example, Service de Protection de la Communauté Juive [France], http://www.spcj.org).

The dearth of reliable data on hate crimes, including antisemitism, is regularly criticized by the two main monitoring bodies, the European Union Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA, the successor body to the EUMC) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR).

For example, ODIHR noted in its 2009 Annual Report on Hate Crimes in the OSCE Region that:

The full extent of hate crime in the OSCE region continues to be obscured by a lack of adequate or reliable data. Although data collection by both governments and NGOs improved in 2009, it is clear from the
information provided to ODIHR that significant gaps in data collection remain a major obstacle to understanding the scope and nature of hate crime within most participating States and across the OSCE as a region. (ODIHR, 2010, p. 7)

CST has sought to involve itself in the process of collecting and analyzing data at the international level; indeed, aside from its liaison with and support for other Jewish community agencies, CST plays an active role within international agencies. The EUMC commissioned a report on antisemitism in 2004 that drew heavily on CST data, and the organization continues to provide data and analysis through the University of Warwick, which acts as the FRA National Focal Point on hate crime data (FRA, 2009).

CST also participated in the drafting of the EUMC Working Definition of Antisemitism, a specific outcome of the 2004 report that had noted:

> The basic premise for a valid monitoring and analysis of a phenomenon is an adequate definition; and the basic premise for comparability is the common use of such an adequate definition within a country, or even better, within the EU. The country-by-country evaluation has shown explicitly that neither is the case . . . . future data collection and assessment should be commonly based on the proposed definition of antisemitism. (EUMC, 2004, p. 24)

Both the U.S. State Department and the ODIHR now recommend the use of the Working Definition, which can be found at http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/AS-Main-report.pdf.

An indirect outcome of the PCAA’s work was the establishment of the Inter-Parliamentary Coalition for Combating Antisemitism (ICCA). In February 2009, the British government hosted its first conference and summit for parliamentarians from around the world, which produced the “London Declaration on Combating Antisemitism” (ICCA, 2009). With this document, parliamentarians agreed to press their governments to honor international agreements, such as the OSCE Berlin Declaration, that focus on combating antisemitism. In November 2010, the ICCA held its second conference in Ottawa. The result of this occasion was the Ottawa Protocol, which noted the alarming resurgence of anti-Jewish libels, such as blood libels and the publication of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, and affirmed the calls from the London conference for governments and international agencies to take effective action to combat antisemitism (ICCA, 2010).

In both conferences, CST played a substantial role, providing administrative support and direction, as well as expert presentations for the partici-
pants. For the first conference, in London, CST organized the parallel Experts’ Forum.

Within the Jewish world, CST was involved in the early discussions that led to the formation of the Stephen Roth Institute for the Study of Contemporary Antisemitism and Racism at Tel Aviv University, the primary agency for the collection and analysis of data on antisemitism. CST staff draft the UK contributions to the annual Antisemitism Worldwide Report and participate in the bi-annual meetings of the contributors to the Reports. CST analyses also inform the reports of the Monitoring Forum, as well as the annual report delivered by the Israel government (see http://www.tau.ac.il/Anti-Semitism/).

CST staff also provide advice and assessments for the World Jewish Congress, the representative body for Jewish communities, and its European affiliate, the European Jewish Congress. CST staff have also participated in all the meetings organized by the Israeli government-sponsored Global Forum against Antisemitism (www.gfantisemitism.org), again providing expert presentations and advice.

VI. ASSESSMENT

In the above-listed areas, CST provides an example of best practice for Jewish and wider communities. It provides much needed security advice and training to a community whose members continue to suffer from physical and political attacks. The nature of these threats has changed since the post-War years, but they continue to undermine the community’s self-confidence. The Chief Rabbi, Lord Sacks, has spoken of the continuing concern of many British Jews, namely feeling the need to look over their shoulders while at the same time participating fully and successfully in political, social, and cultural life in Britain (Sacks, 2011). Neither he, nor CST and its leadership, see any inconsistency in this. Indeed, Jews have come to play a not inconsiderable part in civic life, while recognizing that they must remain vigilant in safeguarding their position.

The terror threat to the UK, and indeed to other western states, will require a continuing high level of security, and CST expertise in confronting such threats is not only in demand by the Jewish community, but also recognized in a very real way by government and the police. CST expertise in training civil society to provide its own security as an adjunct to that provided by the state and its agencies meets the needs of these communities, as well as of the state itself.

Occasional testimony from senior police officers testifies to this outcome. In 2005, the then Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service, Sir John Stevens, expressed the opinion that “The Community Security
Trust is one of the finest examples in the world of an effective crime prevention partnership that really works hard to make the community safer”; and Assistant Commissioner Sir David Veness noted, “If the Community Service Trust didn’t exist, we would have to invent something very much like it” (Community Security Trust, 2005).

The Board of Deputies and CST have taken a lead in lobbying for legislation that guarantees freedom from discrimination on the one hand, and freedom from incitement on the other. It has used its historical experience to inform and propel its substantial contribution. Of course, changes that have been made in British laws in these related fields would not have been possible were it not for a wider concern, and the general review and changes brought about by Britain’s acceptance of international conventions and legal instruments that came about as a consequence of the Second World War and the universal acceptance of human rights norms.

But the Jewish community has seized the opportunities that events have provided to campaign for improvements that strengthened both its security and that of others. It could not have taken these initiatives without changes in British society, and in particular changes in legislation that recognize the social harm that incitement to hatred brings; recognition that racism must be confronted; and, more recently, encouragement by government of a culture that consults and involves civil society to a greater extent than in the past.

Of course, CST could spread itself too thin and take on more tasks that extend beyond its capacity. The recent move into international work provides many opportunities, but also some dangers in this regard. It is also too easy to assume that the norms and standards that apply within the UK might apply elsewhere. Or CST might too easily fall into the trap of seeking to impose its own high standards in an unsympathetic manner, or on communities and groups that do not have the long history of self-organization that prevails within Jewish communities.

The CST is very much an events- and client-driven organization that responds to the needs of the Jewish, and, increasingly, some other minority communities. It draws on the strengths of its predecessor organizations, but it is also clear that it could not have achieved what it has achieved without the parallel political and cultural initiatives that have persuaded successive recent governments to reform and modernize legislation and involve civil society in the criminal justice system and in combating hate crime.

References


Grant payment to Community Security Trust (CST). (2010, May 14). Letter from Home Office to CST.


